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To J. B. Shank, the engrained notion that Newton’s genius can account for the advent of
scientific modernity and the subsequent French Enlightenment is seriously misguided.
Though conceding the centrality of Newtonianism to the philosophe movement, Shank
seeks to root out the “myth” that Newtonianism served as the “natural springboard” for the
Enlightenment. He tethers his narrative to the self-serving philosophes, whose version of
events was accepted de facto and then perpetuated by generations of scholars. Newton’s
critical role, Shank asserts, was historically contingent, becoming effective only after the
publication in 1734 of Voltaire’s Lettres philosophiques. Shank accordingly devotes the first
part of The Newton Wars and the Beginning of the Enlightenment to establishing the
context of Voltaire’s work: the new public culture in France that reshaped the Republic of
Letters during the early eighteenth century. Seminal to this transformation, he contends,
were structural shifts in French institutional and public science, including the proliferation
of new journals; the emergence of a critical spirit that replaced the civility that had hitherto
informed transactions in the Republic of Letters; and the rise of a particularly aggressive
strain of Newtonianism—with the concomitant coalescence of a hostile Cartesian party.
This new cultural landscape enabled Voltaire to articulate the identity of the philosophe,
and it was this novel identity that then launched the Enlightenment.
The second part of The Newton Wars seeks to instantiate the argument through a
detailed analysis of the personae and literary productions of Voltaire and Maupertuis in
the context of the public rows they provoked. Such analysis is in line with Shank’s thesis
that philosophical ideas—in and of themselves—were marginal to the emergence of the
French Enlightenment; what mattered was the manner in which such ideas were deployed
by Voltaire and “the particular self-fashioning he accomplished with them, a self-
fashioning that led to the definition of a new kind of critical, libertarian intellectual in
France” (p. 31). Maupertuis exhibited a complementary model. Whereas Voltaire operated
exclusively within the domain of the public sphere, Maupertuis’s base was initially the
Acade´mie des Sciences, which he transformed, then supplemented, with his own public
sociability. This sociability included the same markings of libertinism and philosophical
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radicalism that informed the early Voltaire and would become the distinctive trademark of
Diderot.
As for Newtonianism, it provided both Voltaire and Maupertuis with the means to
establish their respective public identities and styles of argumentation, as well as to
promote their (occasionally interlocking) agendas. Newtonianism, in other words, is
conceived of by Shank as a “discourse”—in sync with his explicit acknowledgment of
intellectual debts to Michel Foucault and, to a lesser degree, Pierre Bourdieu, Bruno
Latour, and Edward Said. Not surprisingly, Shank applies a distinctly postmodernist
scaffolding to Newton’s deification by the philosophes and his intellectual dominance
during the second half of the eighteenth century. As he explains in a stylistically typical
passage, these key developments
were not natural outcomes of a progressive and teleological Enlightenment modernity, but,
rather, a set of particular historical outcomes produced by French men and women caught up
in a complex web of temporal, spatial, and other local contingencies. In short, this is a book
about a beginning that seeks to escape the spell of teleological origin stories. It is also a history
of Newton and Enlightenment in France that self-consciously detaches itself from the living
history that continually naturalizes their marriage as a self-evident feature of modernity. To
state the same point another way, this is a postmodern and post-Enlightenment history of one
crucial moment in the beginning of Enlightenment modernity, the moment when Newtonianism
became linked to it as its genetic code and avatar. [Pp. 14–15]
Shank further promotes his book as “a work of Foucault-inspired revisionist historical
scholarship, one that marshals extensive and carefully analyzed documentary evidence in
support of a new and different genealogical understanding of the Newtonian legacy in
eighteenth-century France” (p. 25). Accordingly, the first part of The Newton Wars aims
to rid us of two misguided beliefs: that Newton played a “Promethean role in the birth of
scientific modernity” (p. 22) and that there existed “an intransigent war between Newton
and Descartes [that proved to be] the dominant theme of Newton’s French reception” (p.
19). Quite the contrary: “France absorbed Newton’s science immediately and in substan-
tial, if idiosyncratic, ways from as early as 1690” (p. 28).
Shank’s thesis rests on the assumption that a vibrant tradition of me´canique existed in
France, the followers of which developed a distinctively French algorithmic science of
motion, to which was then grafted elements of Newton’s science. Since this native
analytical mechanics derived its inspiration from Malebranche’s mathematical phenom-
enalism, not from Newton, the battles over the calculus and related issues in France had
little, if anything, to do with the Englishman. To this I take strong exception. To
characterize French analytical mechanics as virtually devoid of clear and demonstrative
connections to the Principia grossly exaggerates, if not downright distorts. The work of
Niccolo` Guicciardini, and even that of Varignon’s major modern proponent, Michel Blay,
demonstrates that the fundamental conceptual approach undergirding French analytical
mechanics derived from careful consideration of concepts and methods set forth in
Newton’s masterpiece. Varignon, for example, had begun as early as 1695 to consider the
issues posed for analysis by central force motion—the very concept that Newton had
developed. Varignon’s own contribution consisted in the systematization of results already
known and in the Leibnizian reformulation of central parts of the Principia itself. True,
one area that Newton treated with indifferent success—the motion of bodies in resisting
media—did attract special interest and novel development on the Continent. Yet the
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question of the foundation of what became analytical mechanics has long been a complex
issue, requiring a subtler historical touch than is apparent in The Newton Wars.1
Effectively, Shank proposes to split the mathematics of the Principia from its under-
lying physical conceptions in respect to force. But the mathematics of force cannot simply
be separated from the Principia’s novel approach to the connection between force and
motion. Nor is this connection altogether coincident with a metaphysics according to
which “force” need not be transported by a material object. Even so, the Principia’s
methods for working the force–motion connection were sufficiently novel to generate
bewilderment when first encountered, even by such luminaries as Huygens and Leibniz.
Shank, however, elides this difference, thereby erasing the considerable resistance that the
Principia’s novel mathematics for linking force to motion encountered.2
Lack of precision in explicating the actual content of the period’s science is equally
evident in Shank’s remark concerning the physics of Newton’s Opticks. Shank claims that
Newton had argued that light, composed of material corpuscles, was “subject to a law of
universal gravitational attraction” (p. 114). He should have said that the Newtonian
particles of light are subject to forces that are distinctly and notably different from gravity
in their mode of operation—that, in fact, these forces, unlike gravity, could have nothing
directly to do with the masses of the particles in question, thereby raising difficult
problems that were often discussed during the eighteenth century.
Shank’s doubtful representation of analytical mechanics is further undercut by his
contention that it constituted the “centerpiece of French scientific practice” until the 1710s
(p. 58). Yet, if “centerpiece” it was, then French “scientific practice” must have been in
a parlous state indeed, even within the Acade´mie des Sciences. For contemporaries
recognized that, owing to a dearth of local talent, French analysts lagged behind savants
in Germany, Italy, and England. In 1709 Re´mond de Montmort, for one, ascribed the poor
state of the mathematical sciences in France to Louis XIV’s wars, while a decade later he
bitterly lamented France’s disgraceful inability to raise anyone “capable of entering the lists
with the English and the Germans.”3 This, in turn, leads Shank to misrepresent the
Acade´mie’s history during the early eighteenth century. He is wrong to assert that the
analysts wielded significant influence over its affairs until 1710; consequently, his claims
regarding their deliberate marginalization thereafter lack evidentiary support.
If the dearth of analytical mechanists undermines Shank’s argument that the Principia
was quickly, if peculiarly, assimilated into French scientific culture, its corollary—that
Newton’s physics proper was ignored until the late 1720s—is equally weak. Shank
repeatedly denies the existence of any Cartesian/Newtonian polarization prior to its
“invention” by Fontenelle and Voltaire because, he asserts, the Principia was simply not
recognized as a book of physics but was instead thought of as a work in mechanics with
1 Niccolo` Guicciardini, Reading the Principia: The Debate on Newton’s Mathematical Methods for Natural
Philosophy from 1686 to 1736 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1999), pp. 201–205; and Michel Blay, La
naissance de la me´canique analytique: La science du mouvement au tournant des XVIIe et XVIIIe sie`cles (Paris:
Presses Univ. France, 1992).
2 Domenico Bertoloni Meli’s astute deconstruction of Leibniz’s Tentamen shows just how vexed and vexing
the encounter could be; see Meli, Equivalence and Priority: Newton versus Leibniz: Including Leibniz’s
Unpublished Manuscripts on the Principia (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993).
3 John L. Greenberg, The Problem of the Earth’s Shape from Newton to Clairaut: The Rise of Mathematical
Science in Eighteenth-Century Paris and the Fall of “Normal” Science (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press,
1995), p. 243; and Lenore Feigenbaum, “The Fragmentation of the European Mathematical Community,” in The
Investigation of Difficult Things: Essays on Newton and the History of the Exact Sciences, ed. P. M. Harman and
Alan E. Shapiro (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1992), pp. 383–397, on p. 387.
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several peculiarities that nevertheless did not raise any particularly pressing issues of
physical understanding. French public discourse on science, he writes, regarded Newton
as a “noteworthy but easily dismissed figure,” which explains why “so little discussion of
Newtonian science either for or against” existed earlier (p. 46). This claim can only be
sustained through a selective reading of sources that eliminates the potency of the early
opposition to Newton. The immediate and profound impact exerted by the Principia on
European savants rendered it unnecessary to mention Newton by name when controvert-
ing him. Starting in the late 1680s, with Huygens’s fervent search for more secure
foundations upon which to restore the vortical system that Newton destroyed—and with
Leibniz’s determination to erect a planetary theory that bested Newton’s—the Principia
became the foil against which investigations into celestial mechanics, as well as terrestrial
physics, were carried out. Shank misses the point because he focuses primarily on prefaces
to periodical literature, to the detriment of the content of the science therein discussed.
Constraints of space prevent an elaboration of the extent to which the Principia
informed European science between 1690 and 1715, not only in the science of Huygens
and Leibniz but in that of Malebranche. However, since the Acade´mie des Sciences is the
focal point of The Newton Wars, it is appropriate to emphasize here Newton’s omnipres-
ence in the investigations carried out by its members. Consider Giovanni Domenico
Cassini. As early as August 1690, during a visit of the deposed James II to the Obser-
vatory, he and his fellow astronomers disputed Newton’s position on the effect of gravity
on the earth’s shape. The following year Johann Caspar Eisenschmidt, the Strasbourg
mathematician and collaborator of Cassini, openly challenged Newton on the very same
subject. He claimed that geodesic observations demonstrated that the length of the degree
of the meridian decreases as the latitude increases; hence the globe must be elongated at
its poles and not, as required by the Principia, shortened.4 The topic remained contested.
In November 1701 Cassini presented new meridian measurements at a public meeting of
the Acade´mie that corroborated Eisenschmidt’s claim. Though he noted the divergence of
Eisenschmidt’s claim from the (otherwise quite different) theories expounded by Huygens
and Newton, Cassini refrained from openly aligning himself with Eisenschmidt. Fon-
tenelle, however, evidently concluded that the observations invalidated Newton’s theory,
and in summarizing the lecture for the Histoire he waxed eloquent on philosophy’s good
fortune “that a consequence derived from such a great number of completely new
principles, based on the Cartesian hypothesis of gravity, and on the subtle Geometry of
central forces, is found in such perfect agreement with actual and indubitable measure-
ment.” Unfortunately for Fontenelle, he deduced the wrong conclusion from the measure-
ments, as if they demonstrated a globe flattened at its poles—a far from innocuous error,
for which he was vigorously criticized by Maupertuis years later.5
Shank does not consider this episode, which is hardly consistent with his claim that at
the time there was little French interest in salvaging the Cartesian heavens from the
shipwreck brought about by the Principia. Nor does he note Cassini’s related efforts to
undermine the physics of the Principia. Cassini’s devotion to Descartes manifested itself
in his rejection of a finite speed of light—despite his being the first to deduce it from
observations!—and in his semi-Cartesian theory of comets. True, Cassini’s commitment
to the instantaneous propagation of light and to his cometary theory predated the Principia.
4 Johann Caspar Eisenschmidt, Diatribe de figura telluris elliptico-sphaeroide (Strasbourg, 1691).
5 David Beeson, Maupertuis: An Intellectual Biography (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1992), p. 54. The
embarrassing error necessitated furtive rewriting of the paragraph when the volume was reprinted.
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Yet he never wavered on either issue, even after perusing the copy that Halley had given him.
If anything, Cassini’s resolve to undermine Newton’s cosmology only intensified. Thus in
1693 he publicly challenged the notion that Keplerian ellipses truly represent planetary
motion, positing instead oval orbits wherein the product, and not the sum, of planetary
distances to two fixed points is constant.6 Newton was not mentioned, but the implications
for the validity of key theorems in the Principia demonstrating and extending Kepler’s
laws were unmistakable. Leibniz, for one, was encouraged to contemplate discarding
ellipses, too, in his effort to sustain a vorticist theory, and he eagerly solicited clarifications
on Cassini’s position.7
In the case of Cassini’s covert anti-Newtonian campaign, Shank has not grappled with
countervailing evidence to his general denial of an early Cartesian/Newtonian polariza-
tion. Elsewhere it is his use of the evidence that raises questions. Consider his represen-
tation of Fontenelle’s role in the Newton wars. Cognizant of the Secretary’s “deep
epistemological commitment to Cartesian science,” and of his endeavor since 1700 to
render “vortical mechanics a centerpiece of his public academic discourse,” Shank
nevertheless asserts that no anti-Newtonian “polemical animosity” informed Fontenelle’s
public discourses before 1728. Such a stance was superfluous, since, he argues, no
“precise philosophical position or sect of philosophers opposed to Descartes” existed
either in France or “anywhere else in Europe” before 1715 at the earliest (pp. 69, 67, 47).
Universal gravitation, Shank thinks, simply lacked the urgency and divisiveness that
characterized it subsequently, when new historical contingencies engendered acrimonious
controversies.
Here and in a recent article on Fontenelle’s “alleged Cartesianism,” to which readers are
referred, the Secretary is depicted as “one of France’s first ‘Newtonians,’” entirely on the
basis, it seems, of Shank’s conflation of Fontenelle’s embrace of the calculus with an
embrace of analytical mechanics. There is little, if any, evidence for this. Equally to the
point, Fontenelle’s commitment to vorticist cosmology is alleged to have been “anything
but dogmatic,” merely furnishing the urbane and probabilist Secretary with an elegant
picture—one of many possible pictures—with which to illustrate the workings of nature.
For Fontenelle and his compatriots, Shank contends, there existed no necessary connec-
tion between fidelity to Descartes and opposition to Newton.8 A careful reading of
Fontenelle’s works cannot sustain such an interpretation. Fontenelle’s centrality to
Shank’s narrative consequently warrants an extended illustration of his quite early anti-
Newtonian crusade.
By necessity, Newton’s position as a foreign associate of the Acade´mie prior to 1727
6 Giovanni Domenico Cassini, De l’origine et du progre`s de l’astronomie (Paris, 1693), rpt. in Oeuvres
diverses de M. I. D. Cassini (Paris, 1730), pp. 43–44. For Cassini’s continuing commitment to his Cartesian
views see Laurence Bobis and James Lequeux, “Cassini, Rømer, and the Velocity of Light,” Journal of
Astronomical History and Heritage, 2008, 11:97–105.
7 Cassini’s colleague, La Hire, also rejected ellipses and pronounced that planetary orbits failed to describe any
perfectly regular curve. See G. W. Leibniz, Mathematische Schriften, ed. C. I. Gerhardt, 7 vols. (Halle: H. W.
Schmidt, 1856), Vol. 2, Pt. 3, p. 498; Johan I Bernoulli, Der Briefwechsel von Johann I Bernoulli, Vol. 2: Der
Briefwechsel mit Pierre Varignon, ed. Pierre Costabel and Jeanne Peiffer (Basel: Birkha¨user, 1988), Pt. 1, p. 182;
I. Bernard Cohen, “Leibniz on Elliptical Orbits: As Seen in His Correspondence with the Acade´mie Royale des
Sciences in 1700,” Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, 1962, 17:72–82; and Arthur
Birembaut, Costabel, and Suzanne Delorme, “Les correspondance Leibniz–Fontenelle et les relations de Leibniz
avex l’Acade´mie royale des Sciences en 1700–1701,” Revue d’Histoire des Sciences et de Leurs Applications,
1966, 19:115–132.
8 J. B. Shank, “On the Alleged Cartesianism of Fontenelle,” Archives Internationales d’Histoire des Sciences,
2003, 53:139–156.
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mandated that, for reasons of propriety and order, any crusade against him had to be
covert—a restriction that hardly diminished its potency. Case in point is the effective
manipulation of the Histoire, already noted in the context of Cassini. In 1701, for example,
the Acade´mie launched an ambitious undertaking to collect tidal information. Shank
denies that the effort had any connection to the Principia, ascribing it instead solely to a
new utilitarian plan initiated by the government and celebrated by Fontenelle as a
“worthwhile collaboration between the Crown, the Academy, and the public” (p. 65). Yet,
no such celebration appears in Fontenelle’s Histoire, save for gratitude for Pontchartrain’s
continued support of projects initiated by the academicians themselves. More disconcert-
ing is Shank’s failure to mention that Fontenelle openly conferred on Descartes “all
honor” for having discovered the cause of tides and went on to rationalize the project as
an effort to ascertain that the phenomenon would be comprehended with the same
exactitude that Descartes’s system already possessed.9 Equally telling is the persistence
with which Fontenelle routinely undermined the tenor of Varignon’s contributions to the
elucidation of central forces—a critical element of Newton’s system—and his habitual
framing of such work within the context of Cartesian vortices, a framing that was wholly
absent from Varignon’s analyses.
Fontenelle was also instrumental in the promotion of Philippe Villemot’s Nouveau
syste`me (1707). He furnished the requisite imprimatur and most likely authored the
lengthy and favorable review in the Journal des Savants, before situating the book at the
center of the Acade´mie’s activities. The Nouveau syste`me generated considerable excite-
ment by virtue of being the first French attempt to reconcile vortices with Kepler’s third
law and related empirical observations—albeit without resort to higher mathematics.
Villemot feigned ignorance of the Principia before completing his manuscript, but the
book’s argument clearly indicates that Newton’s masterpiece had been his target.10
Fontenelle used Villemot’s book in order to forge a new context within which to discuss
central forces—having argued during the previous five years, in an effort to play down the
import of Varignon’s work, that the topic had been exhausted—as well as Cassini’s
cometary theory. The excitement generated by the prospect of rectifying Cartesian celes-
tial physics along the contours suggested by Villemot may well have led to the election
on 12 March 1707 of three e´le`ves—Bomie, Saulmon, and Saurin—who were expected to
carry out such work and to challenge Newton directly.
Bomie was directed to work on central forces and further reconcile Cartesian vortices
to Kepler’s laws—the first fruits of which he delivered at a public meeting of the
Acade´mie on 18 April 1708. Saulmon was set to explore cylindrical vortices—both
mathematically and experimentally—as part of researches that were presented in the early
1710s. Saurin proved the most aggressive. Aligning himself with the “ingenious” Villemot
in a 1709 public lecture, Saurin challenged the validity of objections to vortices by both
Huygens and Newton and boasted his triumph in locating “the cause of gravity in the
centrifugal endeavor of the celestial matter that surrounds us.” He concluded with a
pointed jibe at Newton, who
chooses rather to consider gravity as a quality inherent in bodies, and to renew the exploded
notions of occult qualities and attraction. We must not flatter ourselves, that in all our physical
9 Histoire de l’Acade´mie Royale des Sciences [1701] (rpt., Paris, 1743), p. 11.
10 Leibniz, similarly, feigned ignorance of the Principia in writing his Tentamen, though Meli has proved
otherwise; see Meli, Equivalence and Priority (cit. n. 2).
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inquiries, we can ever surmount all difficulties: but however let us always philosophize upon
clear, mechanical principles; if we quit them, all the light that we can have is extinguished, and
we are plunged anew into the old darkness of peripateticism, from which heaven preserve us.11
Significantly, every work that challenged Newton was presented during one of the
biannual open meetings of the Acade´mie, thereby ensuring the widest possible public
hearing. Fontenelle’s commemorations of deceased members were delivered at these
public meetings as well, and they, too, provided occasions to assail Newton. The 1715
eulogy of Malebranche, for instance, enabled the Secretary to marvel at the Oratorian’s
rectification and extension of Cartesian science. Above all, he extolled Malebranche’s
“key to the whole of physics”—the principle of minute vortices—from which gravity
itself, hitherto “incomprehensible,” followed. When eulogizing Montmort four years later,
Fontenelle noted with evident glee how neither his election as a Fellow of the Royal
Society nor his friendship with Brooke Taylor seduced Montmort to embrace universal
gravitation. He remained a steadfast defender of Cartesianism and “sent the Attractions
back to the nothingness from which they were trying to emerge.” And rightly so,
Fontenelle concluded. For “if one wishes to understand what is said, there are only
Impulsions, and if one does not care to understand, there are Attractions, and anything else
one likes.”12
The powerful abbe´ Bignon, who regularly served as President of the Acade´mie des
Sciences, evidently shared Fontenelle’s prejudice in favor of vortices. As one of Bignon’s
eulogizers put it, “Descartes’s system, which was dominant when he was a student,
received all his admiration; vortices were always dear to him. He was too confident to be
in the least unfaithful to them in favor of Newtonian attraction, so fashionable today.”13
Shank does not examine the considerable body of evidence documenting the Acade´mie’s
tenacious anti-Newtonian campaign or Fontenelle’s orchestration—undoubtedly with
Bignon’s approval—of its public articulation. Saurin’s lecture, for example, is noted in
passing for breaking “the official silence surrounding” universal gravitation, while Mont-
mort’s eloge is misleadingly stated to exemplify Fontenelle’s “hoˆnne´te management” of
disputes (pp. 125, 147). There was little if anything “hoˆnne´te” about Fontenelle’s literary
ploys, and to assert otherwise ignores the ample evidence for his characteristic manipu-
lations. Nor does Shank explore the much larger body of evidence attesting to the
pervasive opposition to Newtonian science by the educated public at large.
The absence of countervailing evidence from Shank’s account, or its downplaying,
reflects one of its primary aims, which is less to present a thoroughgoing picture of the
early diffusion of Newtonianism into France than to develop a rather tendentious argument
regarding self-fashioning—an argument that would at best be extremely difficult to make
if the true extent of French opposition to Newton had been presented—if, in other words,
the broad outlines of the traditional picture hold true. To debate whether the imprecise
notion of “self-fashioning” is a useful historical device is beyond the scope of this essay,
11 Joseph Saurin, “D’une difficulte´ considerable propose´e par M. Hughens contre le Systeˆme Cartesien sur la
cause de la Pesanteur,” Me´moires de l’Acade´mie Royale des Sciences [1709] (rpt., Paris, 1733), pp. 131–148, on
pp. 132, 146, 148.
12 Histoire de l’Acade´mie Royale des Sciences [1719] (Paris, 1721), p. 91; Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle,
Oeuvres Comple`tes, ed. Alain Niderst, 9 vols. (Paris: Fayard, 1994), Vol. 6, pp. 355, 474; and Charles B. Paul,
Science and Immortality: The Eloges of the Paris Academy of Sciences (1699–1791) (Berkeley: Univ. California
Press, 1980), p. 30.
13 Journal des Sc¸avans, Aug. 1745, pp. 1430–1431.
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but the related assertion that France was devoid of critical public opinion before the 1730s
demands response. Though Shank acknowledges in passing the contentiousness of the
Republic of Letters, he nevertheless ascribes a staunchly adhered-to code of civility to
pre-Enlightenment savants. Their science was always “honneˆte”; “contestation and dis-
pute were anathema and partisan philosophical warfare almost nonexistent”; “bellicose
tendencies were anything but positive values within the honneˆte climate of science”;
courtesy was prized over the “pursuit of intellectual conviction” (pp. 29, 62, 85, 105–106,
385). These are but a few instances of Shank’s efforts to differentiate the earlier period
from the Enlightenment proper, when alone a “new individualistic, critical, and argumen-
tative esprit” came to the fore.14
In representing a pre-Enlightenment as a “polite” Republic of Letters, Shank expands
on the problematic claims of Steven Shapin and Anne Goldgar. As Goldgar summarized
the position, “for the sake, not of truth, but of unity, scholars glossed over” all issues that
divided them. Indeed, even when “tempers ran high and salvation itself seemed to be at
stake, politeness, and consequently the integrity of the learned community, often seemed
even more important. Moderation was the only way to maintain that integrity.”15 Such
claims concerning the purported civility of the Republic of Letters cannot be sustained in
the light of documentary evidence that runs directly to the contrary. Far from privileging
gentlemanly conduct and valuing consensus over truth, contemporaries forcefully articu-
lated their belief in the propriety, even necessity, of controversies for the welfare of the
community. Pierre Bayle was explicit on the matter. The Republic of Letters
is an extremely free state. One recognizes there only the imperium of truth and reason; and,
beneath their auspices, one wages war innocently against anyone else. There friends must guard
themselves against their friends, fathers against children, step-fathers against their step-
children. . . . There each is sovereign and judge of each. Here the laws of society do not impede
the independence of the state of nature with respect to error and ignorance; all citizens have,
in this respect, the right of the sword and can exercise it without requesting the permission of
those who govern.
What was prohibited was not controversy but ridicule, “because satires tend to divest a
man of his honor, which is a sort of civil homicide.” “Though one may lose some
reputation as a learned man, and perhaps some Pecuniary Profit,” “if it be done in Support
of the Cause of Reason, and for the Interest of Truth only, and in a civil manner, no Body
ought to find Fault with it.”16
The injunction to carry on disputes with civility did not mean that Bayle advocated a
polite Republic of Letters; he merely proscribed ridicule and the use of abusive language.
Bayle’s own polemics fully attest to his true sentiments on the matter, sentiments that were
fully shared by contemporaries. Consider the case of the Dutch foreign academician
Nicolaas Hartsoeker—whom Shank does not mention. From the 1690s until his death in
14 Nearly one hundred occurrences of “honneˆte” and its cognates appear in the book.
15 Anne Goldgar, Impolite Learning: Conduct and Community in the Republic of Letters (New Haven/London:
Yale Univ. Press, 1995), p. 217; see also Steven Shapin, A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in
Seventeenth-Century England (Chicago/London: Univ. Chicago Press, 1994). For a rejoinder see Mordechai
Feingold, “When Facts Matter,” Isis, 1996, 87:131–139. For a recent analysis of the Republic of Letters and
Enlightenment sociability see Antoine Lilti, Le monde de salons: Sociabilite´ et mondanite´ a` Paris au XVIIIe
sie`cle (Paris: Fayard, 2005).
16 The Dictionary, Historical and Critical, of Mr Peter Bayle, 2nd ed., revised by Pierre Des Maizeaux, 5 vols.
(London, 1735; rpt., New York: Garland, 1984), Vol. 2, p. 389, note D.
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1725, he censured most living natural philosophers, Newton included, with little regard for
decorum. He was unrepentant for the harshness of his criticism:
I very humbly beg of all whose opinions I have attacked, perhaps with too much liberty, not
to take it in a bad way, since I have most often done this only to invite them to do the same
for mine, and to attract illustrious adversaries in this way, in order to increasingly discover by
these means the truth, which is the only thing I seek. They can then make use of the right of
reprisal, and in turn attack my opinions, which I abandon to them completely. This philosoph-
ical war will likely cost a bit of ink, but there will be no spilling of blood.
Johann Mencken evidently had someone like Hartsoeker in mind when quipping that what
“is called liberty in the world of letters” is a euphemism for “unlimited freedom to attack
and slander others on the least provocation.” Nevertheless, he quickly proceeded to
enumerate several early modern instances of animated controversy before concluding with
a paean to them: the arts and the sciences “can never endure in a republic of letters which
knows fear and servitude. No one can tell how much good the disputes among the learned
do in stimulating genius and enhancing the life of learning.” Firmin Abauzit concurred,
deeming that controversies, including insults, prevented intellectual lethargy and ensured
that truth emerged victorious; Dortus de Mairan boasted that “he was never bitter, but only
hot in the pursuit of truth as he saw it”; D’Alembert noted that “anarchy, which destroys
political states, on the contrary supports and ensures the subsistence of the republic of
letters.”17
Statements of this sort can be multiplied. They suggest that Republicans of Letters
believed that the republic was far more resilient in the face of internecine strife than its
biographers assume. Indeed, controversies were not just to be suffered; they were, rather,
to be countenanced, as they ensured the preservation of the critical stance crucial for the
growth of knowledge. Consequently, the pursuit of truth trumped politeness. The Acad-
e´mie des Sciences followed a similar understanding, and Shank is simply wrong to assert
otherwise. He interprets the resolution of the calculus disputes in 1707 as indicative of
harmony and consensual peace imposed on the academicians in accordance with its rules
(p. 63). Yet these rules hardly proscribed disputes. The sole stipulation was that when
debates arose among members, care should be taken to respect opponents and avoid
“expressions of anger or contempt.” A wider net than Shank’s would have shown that
debates were endemic to the Acade´mie and, more importantly, were never considered
harmful. Malebranche’s numerous controversies nicely illumine the point, as do the even
more numerous (and malevolent) disputes engaged in by the Bernoullis. Similarly, the
controversy between Daniel Tauvry and Jean Mery over the motion of the blood in the
fetus proved so fierce that Fontenelle attributed Tauvry’s premature death to the vigor with
which he’d defended himself. Indeed, Martin Lister, who visited Paris in 1698, recorded
that this “great Breach” prevented him from conversing with either anatomist. He hoped,
however, that some good would come of such “honest Emulation.”18
Fontenelle often articulated the Acade´mie’s positive stance on vigorous debate. As early as
17 Nicolaas Hartsoeker, Eclaircissemens sur les conjectures physiques (Amsterdam, 1710), sig. *3; Johann
Burkhard Mencken, The Charlatanry of the Learned, trans. Francis E. Litz (New York: Knopf, 1937), pp. 91–95;
Ellen McNiven Hine, Jean-Jacques Dortous de Mairan and the Geneva Connection: Scientific Networking in the
Eighteenth Century (Oxford: Voltaire Foundation, 1996), pp. 53, 108–109; and Jean le Rond d’Alembert, “Essai
sur la socie´te´ des gens de lettres et des grands,” in Oeuvres de D’Alembert (Paris, 1822), Vol. 4, Pt. 1, p. 345.
18 Fontenelle, Oeuvres Comple`tes (cit. n. 12), Vol. 7, p. 76; and Martin Lister, A Journey to Paris in the Year
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1701, he pointed out that nothing contributed more to the advancement of the sciences
than “emulation among the learned,” within certain bounds. For this reason the Acade´mie
had differentiated its proceedings from those common in the schools, where the goal was
not truth but to “avoid being reduced to silence.” The academicians, in contrast, proceeded
“without ostentation of ingenuity or knowledge”; none was “obliged to be in the right”;
and it was always possible to yield without losing credit. Six years later, as a controversy
between Le´mery and Geoffroy unfolded, he commented on the value of generating
disputes in the Acade´mie: “The specific interest to prove that which one thinks, animates
and heats up the love we have in general for truth.” Fontenelle elaborated further on the
matter in his hostile eloge of Antoine Parent, whose innate impetuousness, the Secretary
believed, engendered a hypercritical temper that expressed itself “sometimes rashly and
often without restraint.” However, Fontenelle objected only to Parent’s personal invective.
The search for truth, he stated, mandated the provision of the freedom of contradiction.
Parent transgressed merely in failing to recognize the necessity to respect those whom he
contradicted.19
Shank’s model Republican of Letters was the Lausanne pedagogue Jean-Pierre de
Crousaz. He is depicted as a consummate honneˆte homme, cultivating “gentlemanly
polymathy” without specialization, the likes of whom allegedly dominated the learned
community. Shank fashions an apposite persona by combining adroitly chosen phrases
without regard to context. The correspondence between Crousaz and the abbe´ Bignon is a
case in point. Contrary to what Shank implies, this was not a free exchange of ideas
between equals. It was a classic case of patronage relations involving an ambitious
provincial savant and the most powerful man of letters in France. Consequently, Crousaz’s
grandiloquent expressions regarding his work, the language employed to solicit advice and
guidance, his offers to dedicate books to Bignon, and so forth—which were naturally
reciprocated politely—cannot be taken literally as reflective of a polite ideal of conduct
shared by the community at large. The correspondence with Bignon, and then Re´aumur,
makes it clear that Crousaz tirelessly marketed himself. By late 1717 he openly solicited
appointment as foreign associate of the Acade´mie—to replace Leibniz. Rebuffed, he tried
again six months later, acting on an unfounded rumor of Newton’s death.
In a similar vein, consider Shank’s contrast of the “judicious philosophical reasoning”
and abhorrence of “passionate, sectarian theorizing” of Crousaz with the aggressive
partisanship of the Newtonians. Shank asserts that a brief section in the Traite´ du Beau
(1714), wherein Crousaz likened universal gravitation to “false beauty,” rendered him
odious to the English, who, consequently, rebuffed the polite efforts of the Swiss to
communicate. Yet what prompted Crousaz to approach John Theophilus Desaguliers,
Curator of Experiment to the Royal Society, in 1718 was his ambition to be elected a
Fellow, a procedure that—Bignon and others informed him—required submission of
written work. Furthermore, the English were irked not by Crousaz’s Traite´ du Beau but
by his submission of an inane attack on Newton’s optical experiments (which even
Bernoulli thought misguided) to the very person who in 1715 had successfully repeated
such experiments before a delegation of the Acade´mie des Sciences! The haughty and
opinionated Crousaz was, in fact, a passionate and unwavering partisan of Cartesian
science—who in 1772 announced a projected treatise aimed at “demolishing” Newton’s
1698 (London, 1699), p. 67. “Emulation,” a term often used by Fontenelle, was a common euphemism for
“controversy.”
19 Fontenelle, Oeuvres Comple`tes, Vol. 7, pp. 353, 373–374; and Histoire de l’Acade´mie Royale des Sciences
[1707] (rpt., Paris, 1730), p. 43.
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physics—and there was nothing polite in the persistence with which he pursued the
campaign against Newton’s experiments, despite their confirmation by Dortus de Mairan
and Father Sebastian.20 Clearly, then, to characterize Desaguliers’s failure to respond to
Crousaz as “disgraceful” and to insist, here and elsewhere, that the aggressive and partisan
Englishmen violated the decorum of the Republic of Letters and threatened its harmony
with discord cannot be squared with the evidentiary record (pp. 70–71, 159–160).
To address most claims of The Newton Wars would require a book of almost equal
length. There are many errors of fact, both large and small. Giovanni Domenico Cassini
came to France in 1669, not 1671, and his son’s name was Jacques, not Jean-Dominique
(p. 65); Malebranche’s Recherche de la verite´ was first published in 1674, not in 1671 (p.
57); Louis XV was the great grandson, not the grandson, of Louis XIV (p. 87); Newton
did not correspond with Richard Bentley in 1698 but in 1692/3 (p. 112); the Boyle
Lectures comprised eight, not ten, sermons (p. 129); Catherine Barton was Newton’s
niece, not his sister (p. 259), and so on. There are places that verge on fiction. Shank, for
example, avers that Montmort’s “love affair with his future wife” “features prominently”
in Montmort’s early letters to Brooke Taylor (p. 134). Never mind that by then Montmort
had been happily married for a decade to his one and only wife; Shank simply misinter-
preted the letters’ content. In one, Montmort effusively expressed veneration for Catherine
Barton’s beauty and intellect; in another, he attributed his inability to study to the
prolonged visit that two charming young women paid his wife.21 Or consider the discus-
sion of Montmort’s acquaintance, one de Rostaine, who was charged with delivering a
package to Taylor. Although Shank concedes his inability to identify the man, he
nevertheless asserts Rostaine’s likely ties to Dutch publishers as well as his association
with Parisian “progressive” circles (pp. 135–136).
These examples may seem innocuous enough, but they are symptomatic of the mal-
leability of the evidentiary record in Shank’s hands. Noteworthy is his claim that New-
ton’s early French reception was tarnished by heretical connotations, Spinozism in
particular. A factual statement by a reviewer of David Gregory’s Astronomiae physicae &
geometricae elementa in the Journal de Tre´voux—that since attraction is, so to speak, the
“soul” of the Newtonian universe, it was necessary to discuss it first—is interpreted as
follows: To call attraction “the soul of the universe” was tantamount to connecting
universal gravitation “with the most threatening of all early eighteenth-century heretical
philosophies: Spinozist pantheism” (p. 126).22 There follows a nearly five-page digression
on John Toland and French clandestine literature, intended to establish an unsupported
claim: that “pantheist discourse about Newtonianism” was widespread and that French-
men grew accustomed from the start to associate Newtonianism with debates about radical
metaphysics and theology (p. 131).
Likewise, Shank mischaracterizes the Tre´voux’s review of William Whiston’s Praelec-
tiones astronomicae in the following year. The reviewer, he writes, quickly went on the
attack. Claiming “to hear Epicurus singing throughout Whiston’s treatise,” he “cited a
Latin passage celebrating the all-pervasive vis animus as a representative synopsis of the
work” (pp. 131–132). Shank mistakes the reviewer’s entirely clear meaning. This was not
20 Jacqueline E. de La Harpe, Jean-Pierre de Crousaz et le conflit des ide´es au sie`cle des lumie`res (Geneva:
Droz, 1955), p. 238; and Abby R. Kleinbaum, “Jean Jacques Dortus de Mairan (1678–1771): A Study of an
Enlightenment Scientist” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia Univ., 1970), p. 151.
21 Brooke Taylor, Contemplatio philosophica, ed. William Young (London, 1793), pp. 88–89, 93–95.
22 Journal de Tre´voux, Feb. 1710, pp. 253–254.
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to link Whiston to Epicurus but, rather, to quip that Whiston’s veneration of Newton
brought to mind Lucretius’s tribute to Epicurus in De rerum natura: “Therefore the living
force of his soul gained the day: on he passed far beyond the flaming walls of the world
and traversed throughout in mind and spirit the immeasurable universe; whence he returns
a conqueror.” The reviewer may have been snide, but he certainly made no attempt to
insinuate Spinozism.23 This is not to say that Newtonianism was never associated with
Spinozist tendencies; only that such charges, few and far between, belonged to a later date
and thus surely did not help set the context for Newton’s reception in France. In fact,
Cartesianism lent itself to charges of Spinozism and religious heterodoxy far more readily
than Newtonianism ever did.
My focus on the first half of The Newton Wars is only in part motivated by consider-
ations of space. I felt it necessary to demonstrate that the foundation that sustains the
subsequent discussion of Voltaire, Maupertuis, and the French Enlightenment is extremely
weak. As noted above, Shank asserts that “France absorbed Newton’s science immedi-
ately and in substantial, if idiosyncratic, ways from as early as 1690.” However, by
“idiosyncratic” he means an exclusively mathematical treatment of motion, while
“France” can at best stand for a handful of people. This focus on a few members of the
Acade´mie des Sciences, together with the adoption of a modish line of argument, distorts
the French reception of Newtonianism and the history of the Acade´mie’s ties with it. The
sharp distinctions that Shank has drawn between public and academic science did not
exist, and partisan Cartesian opposition to Newton’s physics was as potent in 1700 as it
was three decades later. Nor was the European Republic of Letters governed by a code of
conduct different in the early decades of the eighteenth century than subsequently. There
may have been only one Voltaire, but long before he came onto the scene the Republic of
Letters was inhabited by numerous fierce polemicists and a responsive public. Whatever
differences existed were of degree, not kind—with the exception that by 1750 public
articulation of heterodox religious opinions became the new reality.
At the outset Shank announces that The Newton Wars pierces the mythology—created
by D’Alembert (and Condorcet)—that elevated Newton to iconic status in the philosophe
movement and ascribed to French Cartesians an obstinacy that it would require Voltaire
and Maupertuis to eradicate. The Newton Wars does not sustain this doubtful claim, which
would in any case require what is notably absent here: a serious engagement with the wide
range of issues that impinge on the diffusion of Newtonianism and on the origins of the
Enlightenment. One is left to ponder the effects of fashionable trends on sound scholarship
and to wonder why none of those who should have known better spoke up.
23 Ibid., July 1711, p. 1264; and Lucretius, De rerum natura, trans. H. A. J. Munro (London: Bell, 1903), pp.
131–132.
186 ESSAY REVIEW—ISIS, 101 : 1 (2010)
